Aesthetic Style as a Postructural Business
Ethic

ABSTRACT. The article begins with a brief history of
aesthetic theory. Particular attention is given to the
postructuralist ‘aesthetic return’: the resurgence of interest
in aesthetics as an ontological foundation for human being
in-the-world. The disordered individual-as-emergent
artist-and-artifact, who is at the centre of this ‘aesthetic
return’, is then translated into the ‘dis’-organization that is
the firm. The firm is thus defined in terms of its primal
sensory impact on the world. It invokes a myriad of aes
thetic relations between its disorganized self and others: its
essence resides within these relations; its power of being is
determined by its ability to project a unified aesthetic ideal –
a ‘mirror fantasy’. The firm thus emerges as a style: where
style is defined as an organizing – a sculpting – of aesthetic
chaos. In order to achieve a grand style, the firm projects
itself through time as a unified aesthetic ideal; as an ongoing
work of art. The article concludes with a discussion of how
this aesthetic theory of the firm relates to other accepted
theories of the nature and purpose of business organizations.
KEY WORDS: postructural ethics, aesthetics, style,
theory of the ﬁrm
…what is required…is to stop courageously at the
surface, the fold, the skin, to adore appearance, to
believe in form, tunes, words, in the whole Olympus
of appearance. Those Greeks were superﬁcial – out of
profundity.
Nietzsche, The Gay Science ([1882], 1974, p. 38).

Introduction
The history of the study of aesthetics is vast and
diverse. Theories concerning the importance of
aesthetics stretch back to the origins of philosophy
(Nehemas, 1998). Recently, the study of aesthetics
has been embraced by architecture, art theory,
literary criticism, musicology, ﬁlm theory, and
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psychology; rather than a uniﬁed narrative, aesthetics
‘‘is a set of discourses we have inherited’’ (Herwitz,
2008, p. 171). Pre-Socratic origins of the word are
etymologically derived from the Greek equivalents
‘to gasp’ or to ‘breath in suddenly’ (Onians, [1951],
1988); the word is also linked to ‘play’ and being
‘beyond time’:
Phenomena which manifest or appear with the
impact of a prominent or memorable emer
gence…provoke the involuntary intake of breath…A
gasp of this order ‘stops’, as it were, time itself – one is
invariably ‘breathless’ before the emergence of the
authentically beautiful…It goes without saying that
such provocations to our everyday are more than just
‘‘smart and pretty’’ (Postrel, 2003, p. 182), at the very
least they launch a thousand ships. [Chytry, 2007,
p. 40]
In the context of the foundational and precontextual nature of aesthetic judgment, Chytry
notes ‘‘the vital discovery that Schiller borrowed
and expanded from Kant of the aesthetic as focused
on the ‘free play’ of human faculties whenever
understanding and imagination are in a state of
spontaneous openness or ‘indeterminability’ prior
to being ‘constrained’ either toward adopting a
cognitive or a moral stance’’ (p. 37).
In terms of developing a ‘general theory’ of aes
thetics, Kant’s Critique of Judgment is generally viewed
as seminal (Herwitz, 2008; Nehemas, 1998). Kant
deﬁnes aesthetic appreciation in terms of ‘‘the faculty
of estimating an object or a mode of representation by
means of a delight or aversion apart from any interest.
The object of such delight is called beautiful’’ ([1790],
1952, p. 139). ‘Apart from any interest’ implies that
aesthetic judgment does not rest on ulterior utilitarian
motives: the ‘‘aesthetic attitude [is] the disinterested
(with no ulterior purpose) and sympathetic attention
to and contemplation of any object of awareness

whatever, for its own sake’’ (Stolnitz, 1960, p. 32).
Kieran provides an arboreal illustration:
We might look at a tree in the garden and be
interested in it in terms of what species it is (theoretical
interest) or whether it is blocking out the sun and
should be cut back (practical interest). However, we
might just sit back and attend to the contours of the
trunk and branches, their stratiﬁcation, the way the
leaves rustle and sway gently in the wind, the dappled
shadows cast on the bough, the bent-arm-like crook
of a branch as it stretches out. In this case we’re dis
interested since we look at the tree and, if we’re lucky,
so doing will afford us pleasure. [2005, p. 67]
Nietzsche, anticipating Freud, recognizes aes
thetic attraction as pre-cognitively sensual: ‘‘every
perfection, all the beauty of things, revives through
contiguity this aphrodisian bliss [die aphrodisische
Seligkeit]’’ ([1888], 1967, p. 1). Recently, Genette
has returned to Kant in emphasizing its contempla
tive nature: ‘‘an experience of intransitive, rapt
attention on any object which may elicit interest’’
(1999, p. 20). Thus any object, and not just objects
ofﬁcially labelled as ‘art’, can be evaluated on the
basis of aesthetic quality: ‘‘Aesthetics shows rather
than tells, delights rather than instructs. The effects
are immediate, perceptual, and emotional’’ (Postrel,
2003, p. 6). Murdoch emphasizes the ability of
aesthetics to transcend personal ego, and to present
the viewer with an objective vision of reality:
I am looking out of my window in an anxious and
resentful state of mind, oblivious to my surroundings,
brooding perhaps on some damage done to my pres
tige. Then suddenly I observe a hovering Kestrel. In a
moment everything is altered. The brooding self with
its hurt vanity has disappeared…Good art reveals what
we are usually too selﬁsh and too timid to recognize,
the minute and absolutely random detail of the world,
and reveals it together with a sense of unity and form.
Good art shows us how difﬁcult it is to be objective by
showing us how differently the world looks to an
objective vision…It is a kind of goodness by proxy.
[1980, pp. 84–87]

Murdoch’s linking of aesthetics with morality and
with our basic being in the world invokes the most
foundational aesthetic narrative: the notion of a
human life itself as a work of art. In this narrative,
subject and object converge. We are individually

both the artist and artefact, sculptor and sculpture;
‘‘the artist as his own spectator’’ (Lamb, 2005, p. 46).
The projection of our being through time is a pro
cess of continual creative self-transformation; a
‘‘sculpting of the self’’ (Peters and Michael, 2005, p.
383). In The Art of Living, Nehemas describes this
aesthetics-as-ontology: ‘‘As in the acknowledged
arts, there are no rules for producing new and
exciting works. As in the acknowledged arts, there is
no best work – no best life – by which all others can
be judged…[But] that does not imply that judgment
is impossible, that every work is as good as
every other…[A]esthetic difference and multiplic
ity…enriches and improves human life’’ (1998, p.
10). As Nehemas notes, this notion of aesthetics as
central to human being has a long pedigree stretching
back through Aristotle to early classicism. It has been
revived recently by a group of philosophers loosely
labelled as ‘postsructuralists’ (Cazeaux, 2000; Her
witz, 2008). In order to develop an aesthetic theory
of the ﬁrm, it is to narrative that the remainder of
this article turns.

The aesthetic return
In the introduction to The Continental Aesthetics
Reader, Cazeaux observes that ‘‘[a]esthetics has
undergone a radical transformation in the last hun
dred years’’. He continues:
Traditionally, the subject [of aesthetics] has always
occupied the margins of philosophy, for the simple
reason that it deals with those aspects of experience
which are the least amenable to categorization, i.e., art,
beauty, emotion, and the ever-changing delights of the
senses. However, the divisions imposed on reality by
modern reason and changes brought about by the
industrialization of experience have necessitated a
rethinking of the relationship between the individual
and reality. Gone are notions of a distinct self in receipt
of a mind-independent world and, in their place, are
theses to the effect that consciousness and reality are
interconnected at a fundamental level…The aesthetic,
formerly exiled from mainstream attention, assumes
centre-stage as the region to which we can turn for
new cognitive possibilities and a sensibility that is
critical of the divisions exercised by modern thought.
[2000, p. xiii]

Nietzsche anticipated this aesthetic return by
centring his philosophy on aesthetics: ‘‘we have
our highest dignity in our signiﬁcance as works of
art – for it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that
existence and the world are eternally justiﬁed –’’
([1888], 1967, p. 449). Following Nietzsche,
Foucault wonders, ‘‘couldn’t everyone’s life be
come a work of art? Why should the lamp or the
house be an art object, but not our life?’’ (1973, p.
350). Following Foucault, the central question
posed in this article could be summarized as ‘Why
should the lamp be an art object, but not the ﬁrm
that produced it?’ Again, this casts the ﬁrm in the
aesthetic role of both subject and object. It also
means, as Cummins observes, ‘‘the acceptance of a
human individual as a metaphor for organization’’
(2000, p. 162). However, this metaphor already
exists in the poststructuralist rendition of the decentred individual (Cazeaux, 2000, pp. 367–383).
Indeed, the essential process of the aesthetics-of
existence is to use art as a means of ordering and
harmonizing the disparate human psyche. Thus,
the human is already decentred; the human is a
(dis)-organization of emotional drives: ‘‘To be
come master of the chaos one is; to compel one’s
chaos to become form…that is the grand ambition
here’’ (Nietzsche, Will to Power, [1882–1888],
1967, p. 444).
This organizing and directing of disparate drives is
captured by the concept of a stylization of existence:
‘‘The creation of unity out of diversity is given [by
Nietzsche] the name ‘style’. Style is the coordinated
exploitation of powerful instincts…Grand style, as
demonstrated by classicism, is the effect achieved
through the harnessing of violent and varied pas
sions, and their placement under the rule of a pre
dominant drive’’ (Thiele, 1990, p. 63). Indeed it is
this concept of style as an organizing, enhancing, and
directing force – as developed particularly by
Nietzsche, Foucault, and Derrida – that provides the
basis here for an aesthetic theory of the ﬁrm. Within
such a theory the power of the ﬁrm – in the sense of
the impact through time of the ﬁrm on our world –
originates not in any material property (size, proﬁt
ability, etc.) nor in some measure of moral worth,
but rather in the ﬁrm’s style. Style is the essence of the
ﬁrm: the grander the style the greater the initiatory
impact of the ﬁrm: the more powerful the ﬁrm’s
being.

Style as the Essence of the ﬁrm
Essence, from the latin esse ‘to be’ delves beneath
affective characteristics of the ﬁrm: Is the ﬁrm
proﬁtable? Is the ﬁrm ethical? It plumbs the depths
of being in the Heideggerian ([1927] 2008) sense by
simply asking: Is the ﬁrm? What is the fundamental
impact of the ﬁrm on our sensory awareness of it?
Ongoing experimental research in psychology
indicates that aesthetic impact in general has a
powerful inﬂuence on both our perception of the
world, and how we act in the world. Temporally,
aesthetic impacts can be long and contemplative, or
pre-attentively instant. For example, a recent study
by Olson and Marshuetz (2005) ﬁnds that we are
aesthetically impacted by an object even though it is
shown to us for just a fraction of a second; indeed we
are not even aware, consciously, that we have seen
it. These aesthetic impacts also inﬂuence our nonaesthetic evaluation of objects: ‘‘Improving the aes
thetics of a system can have many beneﬁts which
extend beyond affective issues…[U]sers of an auto
mated teller machine perceived the system to be
easier to use based solely on its aesthetic appear
ance;…attractive things work better’’ (Bauerly and
Liu, 2008).
Today, the origin of much of these aesthetic
impacts – whether intentionally or unintentionally –
is the ﬁrm. We are awash in business-originating
aesthetic stimuli: logos, products, advertising,
architecture, even the phonetic impact of the ﬁrm’s
name, ﬂood our senses daily. Therefore, again to
borrow from Heidegger, we are thrown into an
aesthetic relation to the ﬁrm. This fundamental and
ongoing sensory relation of us to the ﬁrm that ren
ders the ﬁrm, at its essence, a work of art. As Genette
observes: ‘‘it is not the object that makes the relation
aesthetic, but the relation that makes the object
aesthetic’’ (1999, p. 11). Our most fundamental
relation to the ﬁrm is an aesthetic relation through
time. What determines the power of this aesthetic
relation? What unites it and intensiﬁes it around a
given ﬁrm?
The power of these myriad aesthetic relations
between us and a given ﬁrm is uniﬁed and intensiﬁed
by the cultivation of a corporate style: aesthetically,
the ﬁrm projects itself as a style; the grander the style
the stronger the attraction of the ﬁrm to us,
strengthening the aesthetic relation. Thus, within this

aesthetic theory of the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm itself is at its core
an idealized assimilation of aesthetic chaos. Thus,
central to this aesthetic theory of the ﬁrm is the no
tion of the ﬁrm-as-style. Therefore, the normative
implication here is of the ﬁrm willing toward a grand
style. However, what exactly is meant here by the
notion of the ﬁrm’s aesthetic style?
The ﬁrm’s style is the essence of the aesthetic
relations it invokes. Style is the essence both in the
above sense of esse, of fundamental being; but also in
the sense of a uniﬁed and intense force that per
meates – that ﬂavours (to use a culinary metaphor) –
these myriad aesthetic relations. To illustrate, con
sider the following passage from Nietzsche’s Joyful
Wisdom, quoted by Derrida in Spurs: Nietzsche’s
Styles:
Here I stand in the midst of the surging of the breakers,
whose white ﬂames fork up to my feet; -from all sides
there is howling, threatening, crying, and screaming at
me, while at the lowest depths the old earth shaker
sings his aria hollow like a roaring bull; he beats such
an earth shaker’s measure thereto, that even the hearts
of these weathered rock-monsters tremble at the
sound. Then suddenly, as if born out of nothingness,
there appears before the portal of this hellish labyrinth,
only a few fathoms distant, – a great sailing ship gliding
silently along like a ghost. Oh, this ghostly beauty!
With what enchantment it seizes me! What? Has all
the repose and silence of the world embarked here?
Does my happiness itself sit in this quiet place, my
happier ego, my second immortalized self? …. But
still! But still! My noble enthusiast, there is also in the
most beautiful sailing ship so much noise and bustling,
and alas, so much petty, pitiable bustling! The
enchantment and the most powerful effect of woman
is, to use the language of philosophers, an effect at a
distance, an action in distans; there belongs thereto,
however, primarily and above all – distance! [In Derrida
(1978) 1991, pp. 357–358].

In the context of an aesthetic theory of the ﬁrm,
Nietzsche’s ‘‘great sailing ship’’ is the ﬁrm-as-style.
The ﬁrm’s style/stylus (Nietzche’s sailing-ship’s
prow) penetrates the turbulent chaos of aesthetic
stimuli in which we are adrift: ‘‘breaks up the
waves…[leaving a]…trace, wake, indication, mark’’
(Derrida, pp. 355–356). If powerful, the ﬁrm-as
style appears – necessarily at a distance – as an
enigmatic but nonetheless desirable temptress, a
veiled truth-of-being: something we wish to get

closer to, to form a relation with, to board. How
ever, why necessarily at a distance?
Distance is required because style encompasses the
totality of the individual’s/ﬁrm’s being on the world:
to see the sailing ship as beautiful we must see its
totality, which requires distance. I may admire the
laptop on which I am currently typing as possessing
aesthetic worth: its soft colours, ﬂowing curvelin
earity, imaginative logo, may elicit pleasure (perhaps
even Nietzsche’s ‘aphrodisian bliss’). However, for
the ﬁrm that produced and/or marketed it to have
style would require that whatever aesthetic qualities
this laptop possesses permeates every sensory pro
jection of this organization. In order to determine
this requires that the ﬁrm is experienced, and indeed
experiences itself, from a distance. Here, ‘distance’ is
not geographic, although physical space is an aspect,
but rather psychological: the distance of non-preju
dicial disinterestedness, of experiencing the ﬁrm as a
uniﬁed aesthetic object, of objectifying the ﬁrm as a
surface relation. As Genette observes ‘‘objectiﬁcation
constitutes aesthetic appreciation’’ (1999, p. 89).
Consider, hypothetically, that I objectify Nike
Inc. through a perceived style of ‘athletic grace and
prowess’. Note that this being-in-the-world of Nike
Inc. only exists in the interstices of my aesthetic
relation to it; ‘‘these are only – my truths’’ (Nietzsche,
in Derrida, p. 374). Nike Inc. in its physical presence
of employees, corporate ofﬁces, ﬁnancial statements,
etc. is a style-less nexus of contracts with its ‘‘petty,
pitiable bustling’’. However, when I sensually
experience Nike’s logo, advertising, products – when
I don my Nike running shoes – I aesthetically dis
tance myself from this ‘Nike-as-nexus-of-contracts’.
I do not see this latter physical and intellectual pres
ence. What I see is myself reﬂected in Nike’s stylistic
prism of athletic-grace-and-prowess: I see ‘‘my
happier ego, my second immortalized self’’. Thus, at
the most basic sensory level Nike Inc. is this stylized
projection of myself: ‘‘In art we are given what we
seek: a mirror through which we may see ourselves in
the form of a more gloriﬁed other…’’ (Lacan, [1977],
2008, p. 153). Through my sensory interaction with
– my aesthetic relation to – this pair of shoes I try to
board the ‘‘great sailing ship’’.
In Lacanian terms, a powerful style plays on our
‘‘insatiable appetite for otherness’’ (in Cazeaux,
2000, p. 496). This style should not be confused with
product design: the latter exists as a physical charac

teristic of the shoes; the former resides purely in my
aesthetic relation to them. Therefore, a pair of shoes
may posses certain distinctive design characteristics –
e.g., stitching conﬁgurations, fabric combinations,
logo positioning, colour combinations, etc. – but it
is only in my aesthetic relation to this pair of shoes
that the style of ‘athletic-grace-and-prowess’ emer
ges. From the designer’s perspective, the challenge is
to invoke the desired style; but the style itself is what
Genette terms an ‘‘emergent property’’ (p. 92):
Nike’s-style-as-athletic-grace-and-prowess does not
exist physically within the design of the shoe, ‘grace’
and ‘prowess’ are ‘‘evaluative predicates’’ (ibid.) that
I use to describe Nike’s style. This style is, in turn,
my most fundamental conjuring of Nike Inc. as a
phenomenon of my experience in the world.
Thus Nike’s, or any ﬁrm’s, fundamental being
resides in its myriad aesthetic relations with indi
viduals. Whether these relations coalesce into a style,
or even a grand style, depends upon whether the
emergent properties of the ﬁrm’s sensory projections
are consistently interpreted: Do the same evaluative
predicates apply from multiple perspectives? Or
(returning to Nietzsche’s metaphor), on the churn
ing seas of aesthetic chaos, does the ﬁrm coalesce as
an identiﬁable and objectiﬁable sailing ship?
However, this ship is only distinct from a dis
tance. As Derrida observes, this style both veils and
reveals in the sense that it reveals the ‘‘non-truth of
truth’’ (1991, p. 359): ‘‘All the attributes, all the
traits, all the attractions that Nietzsche saw in woman
– seductive distance, captivating inaccessibility, and
inﬁnitely veiled promise, the transcendence that
produces desire, the Entfernung – belong indeed to
the history of truth as history of an error’’ (p. 368).
The great-sailing-ship-as-stylized-ideal exists to ‘re
veal’ to me the ‘truth-as-non-truth’ of my aesthetic
relation to Nike: in ‘truth’ neither I nor Nike Inc.
are athletic-grace-and-prowess. This ﬁrm’s essential
being in my relation only to exists behind the ‘veil’
of aesthetic distance.
These hypothetical Nike-running-shoes-as-stylis
tic-cipher play a conceptually similar role to the pair
of peasant shoes in Heidegger’s description of art-as
truth-put-to-work in a painting by Van Gogh. He
idegger argues that Van Gogh’s painting un-conceals
some fundamental truth-of-being of peasant life: ‘‘From
the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the
toilsome tread of the worker stares forth’’

([1935–1936], 1971, p. 33). Unlike Nietzsche and
Derrida, Heidegger’s revealed truth of the peasant
woman was a truth-as-such, rather than a truth-as-an
error, but the conceptualization of art ‘un-concealing’
is similar. Nietzsche’s style/stylus reveals a fantastical
truth – a non-truth: ‘‘The sense of penetration is ever
present, but the core is never reached’’ (Thiele, 1990).
The power of Nike Inc.’s style over me is to beguile
me with the Lacanian (1977) ‘mirror fantasy’. A ﬁrm
that conjures a style that ‘works’ – that puts (non)
truth to work – has conjured a telos: Nike Inc.’s grand
style of athletic-grace-and-prowess provides for me
an ideal, an excellence, a vision of human ﬂourishing,
to which I strive through my relation to the ﬁrm.

Normative implications for management
Clearly a ﬁrm would wish its style to be enticing and
beguiling. However, to what extent do managers
exert power to sculpt their respective ﬁrm’s style? It
is true that this style is a seductive fantasy – a
beautiful ‘‘ghost ship’’ – and as such a deception or
mask that arises in the aesthetic relation between me
and the ﬁrm. However as Thiele, in summarizing
Nietzsche’s Politics of the Soul, observes: ‘‘the point of
wearing masks is not so much to deceive as to grow
into them’’ (1990, p. 65). Therefore, the ﬁrm must
grow into its style: ‘‘Style is the exhibition of a selfovercoming…[It can]…lend the appearance of unity
to a plurality’’ (pp. 64–65). Therefore, to return to
Nike Inc., if I perceive Nike’s style as athletic-grace
and-prowess, I should see that reﬂected in all my
aesthetic relations with this ﬁrm. Whatever sensory
impacts this ﬁrm projects – through product design,
marketing, press releases, logos, the company name
itself – should hold up to me a mirror of my ‘fan
tastical’ projection: ‘‘Even the smallest fragment of
the individual’s activity, like a broken piece of
holographic plate, can be projected to yield an image
of the whole’’ (p. 213).
However, style clearly is not entirely within the
control of the ﬁrm. It is, as deﬁned earlier, an
‘‘emergent property’’ arising from my aesthetic
relation to the ﬁrm: Nike may want to project a
uniﬁed style, but it is ultimately up to the subject to
‘read’ Nike as it wants to be read. For example, you
the reader of this article have some aesthetic relation
to Nike Inc.; you have no choice (even if you do not

‘own’ any aspect of Nike, you see the products,
maybe see the advertising, see the logo, hear the
name). However, you may not ‘read’ Nike as I do:
your aesthetic relation to this ﬁrm may not elicit the
grand style of athletic-grace-and-prowess. Far from
the great-sailing-ship, the aesthetic impact of Nike
Inc. on you may be merely a dissonant clamor of
ﬂotsam and jetsam. If you are typical, then this ﬁrm
would not constitute a grand style; its being in the
world would be compromised. Its truth-as-non
truth would be too heavily veiled; the mirror fantasy
too clouded and distorted.
In addition, as beings-in-the-world ﬁrms exist
through time. The mirror fantasies shift with the seas
of aesthetic chaos. Compare, for example, the
modernist gravitas of corporate names such as
International Business Machines, and Hewlett
Packard, with the postmodern playfulness of Yahoo!
and Google; as Herwitz observes: ‘‘Aesthetics is al
ways of its time, in spite of its universalizing claims.
…Art expresses the aspirations of the age in idealized
form’’ (2008, pp. 125 and 153). Thus, whatever
Nike’s stylistic projections, both it and me are
thrown into an aesthetic relation in a pre-existing
and evolving cultural milieu: the ‘‘aspirations of the
age’’ will ebb and ﬂow. Likewise Nike’s, or any
ﬁrm’s, ability to project a grand style – a great sailing
ship – will ebb and ﬂow.
This temporal and indeterminate nature of style
will also add to the challenges of a ﬁrm that strives to
alter its style. Indeed, the grander the ﬁrm’s original
style the more resistant this may prove to alteration.
Also, a broad diversity of aesthetic relations – as
experienced by a conglomerate such as GE or
Unilever – will clearly add to the challenges of
projecting a uniﬁed style; in such cases the style may
attach more to a particular brand or subsidiary than
to the ﬁrm itself. For example, if I enter into an
aesthetic relation with Ben&Jerry’s website homepage – deriving pleasure from its bright colours and
faux-bucolic artistry – I am experiencing a style
projected by Ben&Jerry’s. The fact that legally
Ben&Jerry’s is a wholly owned subsidiary of Uni
lever in no way affects my aesthetic relation. Whe
ther we attach this relation to the ‘word’
Ben&Jerry’s, or the ‘word’ Unilever, may matter
legally or economically, but not aesthetically. What
matters is that the colourful and faux-bucolic style
enticed and beguiled me; it revealed – in a veiled

fashion – the essential truth-as-non-truth of which is
‘labelled’, in the sense of being signiﬁed by the word
Ben&Jerry’s. The economic challenge for the man
agers of Unilever is to ensure, to the limited extent it
is within their power, that the style projected by the
word/brand ‘Ben&Jerry’s’ endures through time
(which is presumably why the word ‘Unilever’ is
absent from Ben&Jerry’s homepage).
The examples of Nike and Ben&Jerry’s above have
focused on the aesthetic impact of the ﬁrms’ productslogos-websites; I am cast in the role of the ‘consumer’.
This seems reasonable given that the vast majority of
our sensory relations with ﬁrms are through contact
with products-logos-websites. However, presumably
if I were an employee of, say, Nike Inc. my aesthetic
relation with the ﬁrm would be much deeper,
encompassing my experience of physical buildings,
co-workers, interior and exterior designs, provision
of food and drink, etc. Indeed, in The Aesthetics of
Organization, Strati goes ‘inside’ the ﬁrm and assigns
the label ‘aesthetic’ to ‘‘personal idiosyncrasies, spe
ciﬁc modes of interpreting events, different views of
what to do and when to do it, and the ceaseless
negotiation of values, symbols and organizational
practices’’ (1999, p. 1). Here, Strati is clearly
stretching the aesthetic label beyond the deﬁnition of
‘sensory relation’ that I use here; but sufﬁce to say that,
for those ‘within’ the organization, the aesthetic
relations become more numerous and nuanced.
However, again the central premise remains: the
richness, the beauty of my aesthetic relation with Nike
Inc. will depend on Nike’s style of athletic-grace-and
prowess permeating my relation; enabling me to dis
tance myself and objectify the ﬁrm as an aesthetic
whole. The buildings, furnishings, decorations, food
and drink, etc. should possess – to my sensory per
ception – the emergent property of athletic-grace
and-prowess. If this is the case, then Nike Inc. has
achieved a grand style; the ﬁrm is a work of art.

Conclusion
Nietzsche famously quipped that ‘‘with three anec
dotes, it is possible to convey the image of any
individual’’ (Miller, 1993, p. 366). The aesthetic
theory of the ﬁrm developed here could be deﬁned
by paraphrasing Nietzsche: ‘with three emergent
properties, it should be possible to convey the image

of any ﬁrm’. If this is the case, then the ﬁrm is a grand
style. How does this theory of the ﬁrm as grand style
relate, if at all, to more conventional notions of the
nature and purpose of business?
In the case of the nature of business, theories from
various perspectives tend to coalesce around the
notion of the ﬁrm as a theatre of human interaction:
serving human needs, whether economic, psycho
logical or social (Etzioni, 1988; Newton and Ford,
2004; Solomon, 1994). Perhaps the most succinct
conceptualization is that ﬁrst delineated by Jensen
and Meckling, building on the work of Coase
(1937). This is the notion of the ﬁrm as a ‘‘legal
ﬁction…[serving]…as a nexus for a set of contractual
relations among individuals’’. They go onto note
that ‘‘viewed in this way it makes little or no sense to
try to distinguish those things which are ‘inside’ the
ﬁrm from those things that are ‘outside’ of it. There
is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex
relationships…’’ (1976, p. 311). The aesthetic-the
ory-of-the-ﬁrm outlined here bears some notable
similarities to Jensen and Meckling’s conceptualiza
tion. Both theories recognize the conceptual
boundaries of the ﬁrm as porous: the ﬁrm exists in
relations, whether contractual or aesthetic. Both
theories recognize the ‘ﬁctional’ nature of the ﬁrm,
whether in terms of law or in terms of aesthetic
subjectivity. Where the theories clearly differ in their
philosophical grounding: their fundamental presup
position of the impact of the ﬁrm on the world.
With Jensen and Meckling this fundamental impact
is legal/economic: the relations are ‘contractual’
relations, both explicit and implicit. With the aes
thetic-theory-of-the-ﬁrm the fundamental relations
are aesthetic: the ﬁrm’s emergent being through time is
its immediate sensory impact on individuals. To
some extent, therefore, this aesthetic approach
bridges the gap between economic and social no
tions of business: the ﬁrm-as-style taps into human
needs at the most fundamental sensory level, both
preceding and subsuming the economic and social.
In the case of the purpose of the ﬁrm the divergence
of opinion again tends to focus around the perceived
economic role of the ﬁrm versus its social role: col
loquially, stockholders-versus-stakeholders (Bowie
and Freeman, 1992). However, again the aesthetic
theory of the ﬁrm tends to subvert this divide: here the
purpose of the ﬁrm can be deﬁned as the achievement
of a grand style that will fulﬁl the ‘mirror fantasy’

need/desire of individuals for beauty. This beautyprerogative taps into moral imperatives of the ﬁrm
such as to provide meaningful work and a sense of craft
or vocation (Bowie, 1991; Klein, 1998; MacIntyre,
1984). Also, in the oft perceived connection between
the beautiful and the good (Murdoch, 1980; Nehemas
1998; Stewart 2005), this ﬁrm-as-style taps into broader
notions of corporate moral responsibility.
Therefore, as an attempt to locate the funda
mental being of the ﬁrm – to address the question: ‘Is
the ﬁrm?’ – the aesthetic-theory-of-the-ﬁrm out
lined here provides another perspective on what
Jensen recently noted as the ‘‘remarkable division of
opinion about the fundamental purpose of the cor
poration’’ (2001, p. 8).
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